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Abstract
We analyzed an attempt to develop and clinically test a pneumococcal conjugate vaccine for the developing world,
undertaken by public health institutions from the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland: the Dutch
Nordic Consortium (DNC), between 1990 and 2000. Our review shows that the premature termination of the
project was due less to technological and scientific challenges and more to managerial challenges and institutional
policies. Various impeding events, financial and managerial challenges gradually soured the initially enthusiastic
collaborative spirit until near the end the consortium struggled to complete the minimum objectives of the project.
By the end of 1998, a tetravalent prototype vaccine had been made that proved safe and immunogenic in Phase 1
trials in adults and toddlers in Finland. The planned next step, to test the vaccine in Asia in infants, did not meet
approval by the local authorities in Vietnam nor later in the Philippines and the project eventually stopped.
The Dutch DNC member, the National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) learned important
lessons, which subsequently were applied in a following vaccine technology transfer project, resulting in the
availability at affordable prices for the developing world of a conjugate vaccine against Haemophilus influenzae
type b. We conclude that vaccine development in the public domain with technology transfer as its ultimate aim
requires major front-end funding, committed leadership at the highest institutional level sustained for many years
and a competent recipient-manufacturer, which needs to be involved at a very early stage of the development.
At the national level, RIVM’s policy to consolidate its national manufacturing task through securing a key global
health position in support of a network of public vaccine manufacturers proved insufficiently supported by the
relevant ministries of the Dutch government. Difficulties to keep up with high costs, high-risk innovative vaccine
development and production in a public sector setting led to the gradual loss of production tasks and to the 2009
Government decision to privatize the vaccine production tasks of the Institute.
Keywords: Globalization, Pneumococcal conjugate vaccine development, Regional networks, Public sector
consortium, Privatization, WHO, Developing countries
Background
In May 1974, the World Health Assembly adopted a
resolution formally establishing what became known as
the Expanded Programme on Immunization (or EPI).
The principal objective was to help countries “develop
or maintain immunization and surveillance programmes
against some or all of the following diseases: diphtheria,
pertussis, tetanus, measles, poliomyelitis, tuberculosis,
smallpox and others, where applicable, according to the
epidemiological situation in their respective countries”.
Recognizing that this would only be possible if public
health authorities had access to good quality vaccines at
reasonable cost, the resolution also committed the
WHO to studying the possibilities for expanding vaccine
supply including “developing local competence to
produce vaccines at the national level”. In the years that
followed, as an increasingly globalized pharmaceutical
industry increased its commitment to vaccine produc-
tion, and as a consequence of the ideological shifts of
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the 1980s, this commitment to stimulating local vaccine
production, to ‘vaccine self-sufficiency’, gradually vanished
from international policy statements and resolutions.
Today there are growing signs from different regions
that low and middle-income countries, concerned to
ensure affordable access to vaccines for their growing
populations, have a renewed interest in stimulating
vaccine self-reliance. In Asia, an initiative to increase
regional vaccine security started in 2014 under the aus-
pices of the Association of South East Nations, ASEAN
[1]. Also in 2014 the Organization of Islamic Countries
(OIC) established a Vaccine Manufacturers Group under
a program called “self-reliance in vaccine supply and
production “ with a focus on the Middle East and North
Africa [2]. In 2015, the African Vaccine Manufacturing
Initiative (AVMI) brought together stakeholders to
“develop a roadmap to reach a strategy for vaccine
manufacturing and procurement in Africa”. This was
followed in February 2016 by a declaration by African
Ministers at a Ministerial Conference on Immunization
in Africa, to increase the use of vaccines by –among
other actions- promoting and investing in regional cap-
acity for the development and production of vaccines in
line with the African Union Pharmaceutical Manufactur-
ing Plan [3]. In this paper, we analyse a previous com-
parable initiative, in the hope that the lessons that can
be drawn from its ultimate failure will be of value to
those planning these initiatives.
Vaccine policy in the 80s
In the 80s, responding to priorities of the new ‘global
health’ policy, to the availability of new sources of funds
as well as more comprehensive epidemiological data,
and to the efforts of the pharmaceutical industry seeking
new markets, developing countries acknowledged their
need for vaccines beyond the classical vaccines supplied
in the context of the EPI.
In 1984 at a conference at the Rockefeller Foundation’s
Bellagio Conference Centre, the Taskforce for Child
Survival (TFCS) was installed to energize and transform
existing international vaccine programs committed to
immunizing the world’s children. Antony Robbins,
director of the vaccine development and production ini-
tiative of the TFCS, initiated a more pro-active public
sector role in vaccine development and strongly pro-
moted a research incentive system called frond-end
funding. Robbins and others had analyzed obstacles to
development, testing, mass production and distribution
of vaccines needed in developing countries and observed
that whilst the UN was not equipped to produce them,
manufacturers had little interest in doing so. They con-
cluded that the impediments to develop new vaccines
were chiefly of an economic and political rather than
scientific nature. The classic EPI vaccines could be sold
cheaply because there were no more development costs.
The main obstacle for development of new vaccines with
little commercial interest1 was that the decision to de-
velop is left in the hands of a few institutes or commer-
cial manufacturers in the developed world, who consider
it necessary to recoup the research and development
costs before selling at cost price.
Capitalizing on the new opportunities for vaccine
development created by the biotechnology revolution,
the TFCS subsequently developed an initiative to accel-
erate development of new and improved vaccines for use
in developing countries through a “front-end” funding
program. UNDP had suggested a revolving fund to cover
cost of development. EPI buyers were to agree on long-
term purchase agreements with a small surcharge to
replenish these development costs over a 5 or 10 year
period. The TFCS would establish such fund with a
Standing Committee to manage and oversee it. WHO
would select the vaccines and the TFCS would establish
contracts with developers [4]. These plans for frond-end
funding were presented at another Bellagio conference
entitled “Protecting the World’s Children” in March
1988, which ended in the Declaration of Talloires.
The Talloire Declaration called for the global eradica-
tion of poliomyelitis by the year 2000, but also called for
research and development including technology transfer
on acute respiratory diseases by:
“urging national governments, multi- and bilateral
development agencies, United Nation agencies, non-
governmental organizations and private and voluntary
groups to commit themselves to pursue research and
development, including technology transfer, in support
of the initiatives to control respiratory infections which
hold promise in the years ahead of averting many of the
3 million childhood deaths from acute respiratory
infections each year in developing countries and that
are currently not prevented by immunization” [5].
After interacting with the TFCS during the 1988
Bellagio conference, public sector vaccine institutions
from the Netherlands and Scandinavia responded ac-
tively to this Call for Action, which eventually led to the
establishment of a ‘Dutch Nordic Consortium’ (DNC)
and the pneumococcal vaccine project described below.
The private industry also considered the analysis of
Robbins as a step in the right direction but added that
more incentives would be needed to get real commit-
ment from industry: increased protection for another
product of that company; extended patents or monop-
olies for certain countries, or higher prices [6]. In July
1989, the TFCS solicited specific proposals from manu-
facturers who wished to be considered for “front-end”
assistance in developing vaccines of high value to the
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EPI [5]. Independent scientists reviewed proposals on
vaccines against Meningococcus A/C and Meningococ-
cus B, cholera, Japanese encephalitis and pneumococcal
infections, the latter being submitted from Finland on
behalf of the Finnish, Swedish and Dutch institutes. The
idea was that the TFCS would commit to seek funds
from its members, foundations and bilateral develop-
ment programs, for one or more selected proposals. The
reviewers considered the proposals on conjugate
vaccines against Meningitis A/C and S. pneumoniae as
most promising and the TFCS subsequently undertook
to acquire funds [7].
New consortia in the 90s
In September 1990, at the World Summit for Children
in New York City, WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, the
Rockefeller Foundation and the World Bank launched
the Children’s Vaccine Initiative (CVI) as a major new
global initiative to connect new technologies to advance
childhood immunization. All organizations had come to
realize that the manufacture of vaccines cannot be
assured without taking into account the prospective
development of new vaccines [8].
Around the same time, with increasingly widespread
political commitment to reducing the role of the state,
public sector vaccinology institutions in Europe and
other regions were facing increasing challenges to their
traditional responsibilities. In this context, George Siber
from the Massachusetts Biological Public Health Labora-
tories in the US proposed the establishment of a public
sector vaccine consortium. Public sector manufacturers
in industrialized and developing countries could share
technology for manufacturing existing vaccines and
could develop orphan ”low-profit vaccines for diseases
occurring mainly in developing countries or for rare or
emerging diseases” [9].
In Latin America, PAHO established SIREVA in 1993
[10]. A regional system for the America’s, SIREVA sup-
ported regional initiatives among countries with vaccine
production capacities (Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, Argentina,
Colombia and Chile) [11]. SIREVA initiated regional
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine development initially
in Brazil, but this was not continued. Luciana Leite from
the Butantan Institute in São Paulo, Brazil, when asked
in 2011 to look back on the initiative, remembered:
“within the SIREVA consortium, Butantan started
with pneumococcal vaccine development; by
fermentation of the polysaccharides. Different
countries were to make different polysaccharides. The
conjugation technology was developed in-house from
studying the literature. Butantan in São Paulo and the
Oswaldo Cruz Institute in Rio de Janeiro produced
the serotypes 23 and 19 respectively. Chile and Cuba
joined later. The collaboration failed, because PAHO
had no money: not even money to hold meetings, so
people did not interact. Then SIREVA continued in
terms of surveillance” (Leite, L.,2011, personal
communication).
In Geneva, plans to establish a public sector consor-
tium were also made. In January 1995, the CVI Task
Force for Situation Analysis (TFSA), held a meeting on
fostering partnerships on DPT and DPT based combin-
ation vaccines, where several ongoing initiatives were
discussed [12]. Julie Milstien from WHO subsequently
drafted a strategic background document: “Strengthen-
ing Vaccine Production: A Consortium of Public Sector
Vaccine Manufacturers” [13]. The WHO had taken part
in visits by the TFSA to a series of developing countries
that were producing EPI vaccines predominantly in the
public sector for their national immunization programs.
These visits to manufacturers and the national control
authorities and laboratories in those countries had
identified significant gaps in quality and quantity of vac-
cines. The TFSA had noted that technical support to
those countries had often not been effective because of
“a lack of receptive management structure leading to
frustration with donors and countries”. The proposed
solution was a three-step process. First, countries should
critically look at the cost-effectiveness and viability of
vaccine production in the public sector. Second, vaccine
manufacturers should develop a receptive organizational
structure to be based on elements of viability of local
production. Third, a coordinated system at the inter-
national level to support these processes in individual
countries needed to be set up. This proposed coordina-
tive system of a global consortium of manufacturers
would be managed by WHO and would enable the
sharing of management expertise and technical know-
ledge among its members and would ensure that inter-
national consultant advice would be consistent. It would
also promote partnerships and interactions with public
sector manufacturers in industrialized countries.
This global WHO plan concept referred to earlier simi-
lar proposals made by the Netherlands Institute of Public
health (RIVM) [14] and the Massachusetts Public Health
Laboratories in the US and it aimed to build on the
ongoing SIREVA initiative. The emphasis of the proposed
activities was on quality, production rationalization,
regional national control laboratories, and training in
Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP). The plan did not
elaborate on specific work plans and research priorities
[13]. However, when presented to the Fifth Annual Meet-
ing of CVI’s Consultative Group in São Paulo in October
1995 [15], it was rejected. Despite support from several
developing country producers, such as the Butantan Insti-
tute, several experts and representatives from the
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international vaccine industry were skeptical and
expressed doubts about the viability of public sector
manufacturing. Soon after, WHO silently shelved the plan.
Some public sector supporting participants, such as Isaias
Raw from Brazil, later expressed their opinion that the
international vaccine industry saw the proposed consor-
tium as a “cartel” (Raw I., 2011, personal communication).
Interestingly, about 5 years later, several of the elements
and proposed activities of this plan were taken on by the
creation of the Developing Countries Vaccine Manufac-
turer’s Network (DCVMN) in 2001 [16].
The Dutch Nordic Consortium (DNC)
On 25 October 1990, RIVM celebrated its 80th year of
existence with an international seminar highlighting its
international cooperation in the field of health and the
environment. At this seminar, health institutes from
Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark together with
the RIVM, signed a Letter of Intent to cooperate in the
development of new vaccines for third world countries
(Fig. 1). They decided, “to carry out projects and
programs in the field of public health in the developing
countries, starting with the development of a vaccine
against pneumococci” [17]. Other strategic consider-
ations also played a role. Since all Institutes were tasked
by their governments to supply the national immunization
programs by production or procurement it was thought
that an European collaboration could reduce costs and
benefit procurement in the event of any emergency [18].
This would be also advantageous for the TFCS objectives,
as work would progress quicker if distributed among
members. The DNC would combine the accumulated ex-
perienced expertise of the five institutes, and benefit from
financial support from the TFCS, as well as from Nordic
and Dutch bilateral development aid programs. Resulting
products would be given to WHO and countries in the
third world. Several proposals for new vaccine
development were submitted to the TFCS [19].
Looking to connect the DNC plans with the recently
established Children’s Vaccine Initiative (CVI), in early
1991 RIVM hosted a CVI workshop on “the Role of the
Public Sector Institutions in Developing and Industrial-
ized Countries” [20]. Participants were from UNDP,
UNICEF, WHO, PAHO, the Rockefeller Foundation and
included representatives from public sector manufac-
turers from the DNC, China, Brazil, Mexico and individ-
ual international vaccine experts. With initial funding
from the Dutch Ministries of Economic Affairs and of
Foreign Affairs (Development Cooperation), RIVM had
initiated a Centre for training and technology transfer to
establish or strengthen vaccine production facilities in a
selected number of highly populated developing coun-
tries [21]. It was expected that building on the contacts
and the work by the TFCS, CVI could support public
health institutes in the DNC and use them to aid the
public sector institutions in the developing world [22].
RIVM anticipated to become a major pillar of the CVI
because, as historian William Muraskin has pointed out:
“it saw its ability to help transfer vaccine technology to
the third world as a major justification of RIVM’s
continued existence” [22]. The objective of the workshop
was to define critical issues to successful implementation
of the CVI. In fact, the workshop was an effort to inte-
grate the starting and ongoing regional initiatives
(SIREVA and DNC) into CVI’s strategic plan. The work-
shop proceedings [20] state that participants recognized
amongst others, that
“the SIREVA initiative is committed to improve the
scientific and technological infrastructure and
management of science for public health in Latin
America; that the DNC is committed to the joint
development of new vaccines and to transfer its
expertise to developing countries and that regional
cooperation needs to be promoted in the CVI”.
On the occasion of the First European Conference on
Vaccinology, held in Annecy, March 1992, RIVM’s
Director-General re-iterated his opinion on the role of
public sector manufacturers in the CVI [23]. After
expressing concerns about the slow development of the
CVI, he proposed, referring to the DNC as an example,
a more action-oriented approach with the role of the
public sector in the CVI mainly in research and in
providing scientific and technical support to developing
countries and organizations. To do this effectively, the
public sector needed to maintain a limited role with
Fig. 1 Signing of the Dutch Nordic Consortium Letter of Intent by
the Directors of the Public Health Institutes in Scandinavia and the
Netherlands, at the occasion of the 80th year of existence of the
RIVM, 25 October 1990. From left to right: B. Hareide (Norway’s
Institute of Public Health), J. Huttunen (Finland’s Institute of Public
Health, Mrs. R. Norberg (Sweden’s National Bacteriological
Laboratory), L. Pallesen (Denmark’s Staten Serum Institute) and R.
van Noort (Netherlands’ RIVM)
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respect to vaccine production. Referring to an earlier
paper by Robbins [24], he stated that:
“The new set of initiatives (such as CVI) share a
recognition that public institutions must assume a
central role in managing decisions about vaccine
research, development, production, and distribution”.
However, when the CVI’s strategic plan was finally
published in 1993, none of these proposals had been
adopted. The public sector institutions were not seen as
an essential part of CVI’s strategy neither individually
nor acting as regional networks.
The tetravalent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine project
The DNC embarked on the development of a conjugate
vaccine project because it was thought that the pooled
scientific and technical experience and expertise in the
five institutions would ensure a reasonable chance of
success. The Swedish and the Dutch institutes had in
earlier projects [25, 26] accumulated pioneering experi-
ence in the innovative conjugation technology , and with
the added capacity of the other Scandinavian institutes
on serotyping, animal assays and clinical study design,
the consortium basically possessed all knowledge and
infrastructure to succeed. S. pneumoniae was chosen as
a vaccine target, because of its high morbidity and
mortality in developing countries.
Of the 8.8 million global annual deaths amongst chil-
dren under 5 years of age in 2008, WHO estimated in
2012 that 476 000 were caused by pneumococcal infec-
tions. Disease rates and mortality are higher in develop-
ing than in industrialized settings, with the majority of
deaths occurring in Africa and Asia. Although there
existed a polysaccharide vaccine against the bacterium, it
appeared not to be effective in children under 2 years of
age. There was evidence that a conjugated vaccine, made
by attaching a poorly immunogenic (polysaccharide)
antigen to a carrier protein, would stimulate a more
vigorous immune response and would effectively protect
young children.
This choice for a, in itself rather complex,2
conjugation-technology approach for a vaccine against
pneumococcal infections proved to be correct as shown
by the subsequent emergence of a highly profitable glo-
bal market for pneumococcal conjugate vaccines (PCVs)
in developing countries, now shared between Pfizer and
GSK [27–29].
After the signing of the DNC Letter of Intent, it still
took a long time before start-up grants from the respect-
ive governments and the European Union were in place
and the project could take off. Detailed bilateral collab-
oration agreements were made in advance to describe
each partner’s specific contributions and responsibilities
in proportion to the financial reimbursements from re-
ceived grants.
Initially a vaccine was envisaged with the four sero-
types that were globally the most frequent cause of
pneumococcal disease in children under 2 years of age
(6B, 14, 19 F and 23 F). When successful, another four
serotypes, with specificity for developing countries
would be added to make it an eight-valent vaccine.
The laboratory scale development of saccharide-
protein conjugates started at the RIVM in the
Netherlands and at the Swedish Bacteriological Labora-
tory (SBL) in the second half of 1993. RIVM and SBL
had both independently developed different conjugation
technologies.3 The DNC management committee
decided to use the Swedish technology for the DNC
vaccine and chose tetanus toxoid from RIVM as the car-
rier protein. Norway would apply an animal model to
test experimental conjugate vaccines. The SSI in
Denmark, that housed the WHO Reference Laboratory
on pneumococcal isolates and typing, was to develop
assays to measure the immune response in animals
against each of the specific pneumococcal serotypes that
were to be in the DNC vaccine. Finland’s National Insti-
tute would take responsibility for the design and
operational activities needed for the clinical studies.
In the course of the project, which lasted about
10 years, various impeding events and managerial chal-
lenges, described in detail below, then gradually soured
the initially enthusiastic spirit of collaboration . By the
end of the decade the parties that had remained in the
consortium had to struggle to complete the minimum
objectives agreed with the European Commission, which
by then remained as the only financial sponsor. Despite
these and other obstacles, by late 1998 the DNC
managed to produce a prototype vaccine that was ready
for field-testing in developing countries (Fig. 2). This
prototype proved safe and immunogenic in animals.
Two subsequent small-scale Phase 1 clinical studies in
adults and toddlers in Finland confirmed its safety and
indicated immunogenicity [30, 31]. The planned next
step was to test the vaccine in Asia in infants. Unfortu-
nately, it was not approved by the local authorities in
Vietnam nor later in the Philippines and the project had
eventually to be abandoned.
The challenges that faced the DNC
Financial and managerial constraints
Funding was a major challenge throughout the project,
as it had to be obtained from different sources each with
tedious and time-consuming application procedures. In
addition to the Institutes’ own financial contribution, the
DNC managed to obtain grants from the European
Commission, the Netherlands Ministry of Development
Cooperation and the Scandinavian Development
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Agencies for the development, testing and its production
at RIVM. The European Commission initially contrib-
uted with a grant for a 5 year period (1993–1997) for
the vaccine development. This was followed by a second
5 year grant (1997- April 2002), later extended to
October 2003. The second EU grant served to clinically
test the DNC vaccine in Finland and Vietnam and
formed part of another EU funded project (ARIVAC2),
coordinated by the Finnish DNC Partner, which was to
test an eleven-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine
developed by Pasteur Merieux Vaccines (now Sanofi
Pasteur) in the Philippines.
Overall, the DNC program suffered from too little and
insufficient upfront funding that had to be collected
from different sources, requiring substantial energy and
time of investigators. Despite the long-term preparations
and hopeful early indications, in the end, neither the
TFCS nor the CVI contributed any funds at all. The
modest funds that were raised eventually came with
many administrative restrictions, making it hard to
proceed fast. Moreover, the EU was not interested in
financing the collaboration with SIREVA, that the DNC
hoped for.
Privatization and patent claims
In 1993, the Swedish Government privatized the vaccine
production of the SBL, establishing a new entity (SBL-
Vaccin) and the Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease
Control (SIIDC), which included the research and epi-
demiological surveillance tasks of the previous SBL. The
responsibilities of the Swedish partner in the DNC were
taken over by the SIIDC. This major organizational
chance within one of the partners seriously affected the
institutional collaboration. Added to this, in 1994 some
controversy arose between RIVM and SIIDC in 1994
regarding a patent application filed independently by
SIIDC on the Swedish conjugation technology, selected
for use in the DNC vaccine. The scientific paper describ-
ing the technology, published in 2000, expressed the
hope that the application of the “Swedish” conjugation
technology would reduce vaccine costs for developing
countries:
“Taking into account their simplicity and feasibility for
large-scale preparation of pneumococcal polysaccharide
conjugate vaccines at costs appropriate for the general
use in developing countries, we hope that the described
techniques will be further exploited” [32].
In return, RIVM also decided to independently file a
patent application on its own technology with a plan to
provide later on exclusive licenses to partners in develop-
ing countries.
In retrospect, these cases of unilateral patent applica-
tions had a negative impact on the working relations
within the consortium.
The project’s leader moves to the private sector
In the second half of 1996, the key scientist and informal
leader of the DNC pneumococcal vaccine project, Jan
Poolman decided to join the private sector. Heading the
RIVM laboratory for bacterial vaccine development for
10 years, he had become increasingly frustated in his
ambition to drive development of bacterial vaccines
forward in an institutional climate that at times seemed
to restrict instead of facilitate progress. Poolman had re-
peatedly argued for more capacity and investments in
development programs targeting the introduction of
new meningococcal and pneumococcal vaccines into the
Netherlands Immunization Program. Conflicts with
other units and projects in the vaccine division on com-
peting for access to essential experienced technical staff
and specialized laboratory suites for vaccine production
emerged. In addition to its national tasks, the Institute
was at that time struggling with several international
vaccine projects, including a large EPI vaccine technol-
ogy transfer project with the Chinese Government
funded by a soft loan from the World Bank [33]. Pres-
sures were such that the Institute’s management offered
little support to Poolman’s development projects. As a
national institute under the Netherlands Ministry of
Health, convincing decision makers at the Ministry to
increase budgets for costly vaccine development and
clinical testing, with no promise of measurable short-
term returns was becoming increasingly difficult. Pool-
man grew increasingly disappointed and in 1996
accepted an offer to join GSK in Belgium, where he later
became one of the co-developers of GSK’s ten-valent
Fig. 2 The DNC tetra-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine made
in 1998. The left and middle single-dose glass vials contain respectively
a low-dose (LD) and a high-dose (3xLD) freeze-dried formulation with
the four serotypes 6B, 14, 19 F and 23 F all conjugated individually to
tetanus toxoid. The vial on the right contains the reconstitution fluid in
which the vaccine dose is dissolved just prior to the vaccination
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pneumococcal conjugate vaccines PVC10 (Synflorix) and
several new vaccines against pertussis, Haemophilus
influenza type b (Hib) and meningococcus. His
conclusion at that time was that
“vaccine development and production is not any
longer possible in the public sector due to inadequate
resources, lack of infrastructure and too little will to
make it a success” (Poolman, J 1997, personal
communication).
The DNC was left without a leader during the transi-
tion period that followed. Perhaps coincidentally, at
around the same time, another advocate of collaborative
public sector vaccine development, George Siber from
the Massachusetts Public Health Biologicals Laboratory,
had come to a similar conclusion and moved as well to
private industry. He jointed Wyeth-Lederle in 1996
where he subsequently played a role in the development
and commercialization of the world’s first licensed
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine, the seven-valent PCV7
(Prevnar).
Vietnam and the Philippines withhold approval for
immunogenicity studies in infants
Around mid-1995, DNC members began to consider the
region or country where the vaccine could be tested in
the field. SIREVA/PAHO with its network in Latin
America seemed a logic choice [34]. Bilaterally, RIVM
also had good contacts with PAHO on training
programs about vaccine quality control and quality
assurance. It also had contacts with vaccine manufac-
turers in Latin America, such as the Butantan Institute,
also involved in SIREVA.
The DNC management proposed to the European
Commission to field-test the DNC vaccine in the Latin
American region, by first building up local capacity for
pneumococcal quality control and analytical tests
followed by vaccine production technology transfer, for
example to the Butantan Institute. However, this did not
fit the European Commission policy at that time. The
relevant EU working program had prioritized the Asian
region over the Latin America region. As a result there
were no funds for a SIREVA-DNC collaboration [35].
On top of this, the Butantan management appeared not
to be interested in facilitating a field test in Brazil with a
DNC vaccine if this vaccine had not been produced in
Brazil first. Thus, for its second grant proposal to the
EU, the DNC turned its attention to Asia and in
Vietnam. The Danish DNC member, SSI, had good
contacts there through the Academic Hospital in
Copenhagen and a large paediatric hospital in Ho Chi
Minh City.
With the second EU grant in place, sites for the clin-
ical studies in infants were prepared in southern
Vietnam and Vietnamese staff was sent for training to
Denmark, where the serological analysis was to be done.
The Vietnamese study investigators submitted a formal
application to the regulatory authorities in Hanoi. The
application included a protocol for clinical trials and a
brochure for clinical investigators, made by the DNC
and proposed a field study in southern Vietnam with the
tetravalent DNC pneumococcal conjugate vaccine pro-
duced by RIVM. However, the regulatory body’s ethical
review committee withheld approval. Unaccustomed to
authorizing new investigational vaccines not yet licensed
in other countries and that had not been produced in
Vietnam, their main concern was with the possibility of
serious adverse events. This was despite the documented
evidence of successful safety testing in Finnish Phase 1
studies. At the time of application, rumors were circulat-
ing on adverse events caused by locally made vaccines
and the regulatory body did not want to take any risks.
[36, 37]. This rejection was a major setback and it neces-
sitated a search for a new study in another country.
By the end of 2002, the consortium management
agreed with the European Commission to transfer the
site of the Phase 2 trial in infants from Vietnam to the
Philippines. By this time RIVM had announced that due
to other priorities it would not to continue the clinical
development of the vaccine. Nevertheless, the reasoning
was that, if the vaccine proved immunogenic, the proto-
type could be offered for further development by
another manufacturer, possibly in a developing country.
However, the ethical review board of the partner insti-
tute in the Philippines, the RITM, also witheld its
approval. Since RIVM would not continue the clinical
development, the availability of the vaccine was uncer-
tain. In view of this, the risks of subjecting these infants
to an experimental vaccine outweighed its uncertain
benefits [38] . This second refusal marked the end of the
DNC pneumococcal vaccine development project.
The decision by the Vietnamese regulatory body is best
understood as due to its weak regulatory capacity. At
that time it had no procedures for dealing with applica-
tions for investigational new vaccines not made in
Vietnam. In fact, the weakness of the Vietnamese
national regulatory authority has been a concern for
many decades, and very recently, after an intensive
capacity building program, has it been approved as the
Vietnamese NRA has reached the international status of
being fully competent to exercise the six essential regu-
latory functions seen as essential by WHO [39]. The
rejection by the ethical review in the Philippines was due
in part to the information that RIVM would not
continue the vaccine development. It also reflected the
availability of a commercial seven-valent vaccine that
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covered all the serotypes (and more) that were contained
in the DNC vaccine. The only justification for continu-
ation, that the technology might be transferred in the
future to manufacturers in developing countries, proved
not to be a convincing argument. None such manufac-
turer had been identified.
What can we learn from this experience?
The consortium was not endorsed by the global vaccine
community
Despite the initially active interactions between the DNC
and the TFCS, and later the CVI, eventually neither
concrete collaboration nor front-ending funding materi-
alized from that side. The CVI, once established, became
the international forum for UN organizations, policy-
makers, technical agencies, academia and industry to
discuss all matters regarding vaccine development and
vaccine supply for developing countries. The DNC was
unable to become incorporated into the CVI, one of the
reasons being that the Netherlands and the Scandinavian
countries, as an important donor countries to WHO’s
EPI program expressed concerns that the “US-driven”
research driven and technology-focused CVI movement
would jeopardize EPI country delivery programs [22].
On several occasions, the RIVM management, empha-
sizing its international technology transfer experience,
reflected in a 1995 RIVM International Vaccine Policy
Brochure [14], called for an action-oriented approach
and promoted a stronger role of public sector vaccine
manufacturing in the CVI, but the impact remained
minimal. Over time, the CVI moved gradually towards
more partnerships with the international vaccine
industry.
The lack of a recipient vaccine manufacturer proved a
major weakness
The attempt to establish a “bridging”” relationship be-
tween SIREVA/PAHO and the DNC did not materialize.
In retrospect, we argue that it was a major weakness that
no developing country partner had been engaged from
the early stages onwards. By not including such partner
from the beginning, the research-focused consortium
was insufficiently able to manage the project from the
perspective of either a manufacturing or a regulatory
recipient. Little attention was paid to process-upscaling
or to preparing a technology transfer package to engage
to the Butantan Institute in Brazil. There had been no
early interactions with regulatory authorities in Vietnam
and the Philippines in anticipation of the clinical studies.
Privatization policies hindered public sector collaboration
Over time, the Institutes’ senior management had less
and less interest to the pneumococcal vaccine develop-
ment project. The plan to hold regular meetings of the
DNC Board of Director was never implemented. Due to
ever-continuing institutional reorganizations and shifts
in institutional vaccine development priorities,4 the
research-based consortium team worked in an environ-
ment that lacked a real sense of urgency. The Boards of
the respective Institutes turned out not to remain fully
committed to the pneumococcal vaccine project”. Peter
Bootsma, who co-managed the DNC project from the
side of RIVM, remembered in 2015:
“When it suited politically the “Dutch Nordic
Consortium” concept was enthusiastically exploited,
but real commitment backed with substantial funding,
that was an entirely different matter” (Bootsma
P.,2015, personal communication).
The privatization of vaccine production has since
continued among all the Institutes that formed the
DNC. The small populations of each of the DNC coun-
tries makes vaccine manufacturing economically unsus-
tainable. Sweden stopped production in the public
domain in 1993 (Olin, P., 1998, personal communica-
tion) . Finland stopped in 2003 [40]; the Netherlands in
2009 [41], In December 2014, Denmark has initiated the
privatization of its vaccine production activities [42].
Norway still maintains a contract development and
manufacturing organization to serve biotechnology com-
panies, but this facility will be shut down in 2017 (H.
Nøkleby, 2016, personal communication). At the Board
level of the Institutes, the initial need to guard their in-
terests through a regional consortium mechanism
started to decline almost as soon as it was expressed. As
early as 1996 Lars Pallisen, Director of the Danish SSI,
told European vaccine manufacturers:
”The DNC was useful in the beginning because at that
time some countries were not yet members of the EU;
but it was not so successful with the exception of
R&D pneumococcal vaccine development” [43].
Since meanwhile all DNC countries have now stopped
vaccine manufacturing in the public domain, DNC
collaboration on vaccine issues has ceased to exist at the
policy level. The one common interest in vaccines that
has remained is the sharing of best practices on vaccine
purchases from industry for their respective national
immunization programs of vaccines. Increasingly, such
common interests are guarded through mechanisms of
joint procurement through the European Union [44].
Concluding remarks
In conclusion, collaborative vaccine development on
common political grounds, but with insufficient upfront
funding and unclear end-goals is a risky undertaking and
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unlikely to succeed. Although a promising tetravalent
pneumococcal prototype vaccine resulted from this
effort, it was not taken further due to a variety of policy-
related factors described in this case study.
The sobering Dutch Nordic Consortium experience
formed the basis within RIVM to design, towards the
end of the 90s, a less ambitious and technically simpler
development and technology transfer project for a
monovalent conjugate vaccine against Haemophilus
influenza type b (cHib). The key difference with the
DNC program was that this time the management
approach was entirely partner- and regulatory driven.
The goal of the cHib project was straightforward: trans-
fer of technology for an already licensed vaccine, making
it a “me too” product and therefore easier for regulators.
Most importantly, the early involvement of future recipi-
ent manufacturing partners (who co-financed the
research and development) ensured that every decision
to be taken was evaluated from a receiving partner’s
perspective as well as from a regulatory perspective and
possible impact on the time to license [45, 46].
The profile of the RIVM as an advanced European
public sector vaccine development and manufacturing
institute actively sharing technology with developing
countries has faded over the last decades. Despite some
notable successes in international vaccine technology
capacity building and transfer [33] and the cHib project,
the national mission to develop and produce new vac-
cines for the Dutch national immunization program,
became politically unsustainable. The Institute’s policy
to consolidate its national manufacturing task through
securing a key global health position in support of a net-
work of public vaccine manufacturers [14] found insuffi-
cient support from the Dutch government, nor from
WHO, despite a strong appeal in 1999 by the Dutch
Minister of Health for a core-membership in the GAVI
Board for RIVM’s Director-General [47]. Difficulties to
keep up with high costs, high-risk innovative vaccine de-
velopment and production in a public sector setting led
to the gradual loss of production tasks and to the 2009
decision by the Government to privatize the vaccine
production tasks of the Institute.
Endnotes
1At that time, a new conjugate vaccine against
pneumococcal infections was regarded to be of little
commercial interest.
2Jan Poolman, who left RIVM in 1996 to join GSK, co-
authored a review on the history of pneumococcal con-
jugate vaccine development in 2013. That paper
describes the strategic importance of choosing the right
combination of technical factors that illustrate the
complexity of manufacturing of polyvalent conjugate
vaccines, such as establishing the correct dose, the best
carrier-protein for each of the serotypes and the most
appropriate conjugation technology [48].
3The Swedish and Dutch conjugation technologies
employed in the DNC project differ in the way how the
polysaccharide is linked to the carrier protein. The
Swedish method used thiolation of polysaccharides with
2-iminothiolane [32, 49], followed by coupling to the
bromoacetylated carrier protein to obtain thioether-linked
PS-protein conjugates. The advantages are that it is fast
and suitable for larger polysaccharides and causes less
cross-linking. The RIVM method used reductive amination
of polysaccharides with cystamine to obtain thiolated
polysaccharides [50].
4For example: a dual strategy for pneumococcal
vaccines (national/international) within RIVM, led to a
lack of focus and delays: while for developing countries
a conjugation strategy was followed in the DNC project,
RIVM had simultaneously started research for the Dutch
immunization program on a vaccine development
approach based on a common pneumococcal protein,
“pneumolysin” to which it had acquired a patent. In
1997, the RIVM management expected that the Wyeth
Lederle PCV7 vaccine would reach the Dutch market
within 2 or 3 years. Negotiations with Lederle were consid-
ered to exchange RIVM’s pneumolysoid patent and know-
how for access to Lederle’s conjugate product [51].
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